" A Flaw Not Only In Him": Rereading Thomas Pynchon

Douglas Keesey

[Pynchon's) three books .. . are weak in at least the
sense that they are susceptible to no one certain
outline of an interpretation: that is to say, they lack
emotional power, and all feeling is bogged down in in
tricate cerebral detail. Many readers find them tedious
and unreadable!
More starkly than most, Martin Seymour-Smith states the prob
lem that many critics have had with Pynchon: the elaborate detail in
his fiction seems to work against any " certain" interpretation. Pynchon
seems more interested in fi lling his works with isolated bits of infor
mation than in creating sympathetic characters whose stories we can
follow. As Seymour-Smith puts it, "gobbets of what look like undigested
knowledge hang about and clutter up the flow of Pynchon's undoubtedly
manic inventiveness."z Critics find Pynchon hard to swallow because
he has not properly " digested" his facts so that they may " flow" as
fiction. The bits of information Pynchon provides do not cohere; the
main subject of his fiction cannot be determined; hence, Pynchon can
not possibly be considered a " great" writer. In a telling juxtaposition,
Seymour-Smith describes Pynchon as a writer " who cannot be
categorized-and whose impact is by now fast diminishing:'3 Pleased
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that Pynchon's uncategorizable fictions are no longer sowing confu
sion among future writers, Seymour-Smith concludes with a most
definite categorization (again, his word) of Pynchon's value: "Of course
Pynchon is not 'great' or even almost great: he is not in that category."•
Though obviously overstated, Seymour-Smith's charges against
Pynchon are serious and deserve equally serious attention. Those of
us who believe that the " intricate cerebral detail " of Pynchon's fiction
is intimately involved in the creation of multi-dimensional characters
must do more than give brief lessons in statistics, thermodynamics,
and information theory; we must show how the many scientific (and
other) allusions work in very complex ways to define character just as
characters may work to redefine their scientific (and other) contexts.
The elusive subject of Pynchon's fiction will then be seen to be sub
jec ivity itself-the ways in which scientific, social, sexual, and literary
forms characterize the self as a coherent (or incoherent) entity, and the
ways in which that self may try to remake the very forms by wh ich it
is constituted.
The trouble some critics have had in trying to categorize Pynchon
is due to the fact that his fictions challenge-radically- many of the
categories these critics accept as a given: a reasonably clear narrative
structure or " flow;" allusions that do not come so thick and fast that
they " bog down" the story's progress or impede identification with its
characters; a work of fiction that separates its main subject from all
the other possible subjects of fiction and does not get lost in a jumble
of too many big themes. But Pynchon's subject is that constant inter
penetration of different categories, forms, and contexts, and the way
in which character is the intersection both controlled and controlling
of these forms. The identification he expects us to make is with these
intersected and -secting characters, with their attempt to find a suitable
context in which to place themselves and join with a not-too-different
other.
Critics who have had trouble categorizing Pynchon's three
novels, particularly the kaleidoscopically allusive, 760-page Gravity's
Rainbow, have naturally turned to Pynchon's short fiction for help. " En
tropy" has proven the favorite, anthologized and discussed more often
than any other Pynchon short story because, as one critic put it, " The
significance of the story grows, in retrospect, as an aesthetic source
and a preface for the novels that follow. In contrast to their uncertain
ties, this work is almost proverbial in its clarity and simplicity."5 With
its contrapuntal or fugal structure,6 "Entropy" has served numerous
critics as the strong, clear source (" almost pro-verbial " ) against which
to understand all the complex words that came after. Downstairs is
Meatball Mulligan, who tries to impose some kind of order on a " lease
breaking" party that is fast degenerating into chaos, whi le upstairs we
find Call isto and Aubade, who work desperately to keep chaos from
entering their exquisitely ordered world. Mulligan succeeds in creating
order because he is not afraid of hard work, while Callisto gives up and
allows chaos to overwhelm him .
This is the story as it has been told-categorized-by many a
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critic, generally with the purpose of " providing any early example of
Pynchon's treatment of
[fill in the blank with any major theme]."
The problem with readings of this kind is that, while they may seem
to provide some framework in which to understand the notoriously hard
to-delimit Gravity's Rainbow, they are in fact as reductive of " Entropy"
as they will be of Pynchon's later works, for " Entropy" is, in ways we
shall see, quite complex in its own right. If it can be called a " source"
for Pynchon's later writings, that is because this short story is, like the
works to come, packed full of allusions to many different contexts,
scientific, social, sexual, and literary, no one of which should be arbitrari
ly isolated from the others, for the point of the story lies in their
intersection.
What follows is an attempt to describe the complex relationship
between character and the contexts in which it finds itself made and
which it would like to change in order to remake itself. I begin by sug
gesting a reason for what none of these crit ics seems able to account
for: exactly why does Callisto give up and allow the forces of "entropy"
to engu lf him? I argue that his resignation is really a last desperate at
tempt at resistance, the means by which he intends not to lose, but
to triumph over chaos. This new interpretation of the end of the story
then leads to a reconsideration of its beginning and middle, to a discus
sion of how Callisto's polarizing consciousness is both constituted by
and continually reconstitutes his surrounding contexts-philosophical,
scientific, sexual , historical, and literary. I will show how Cal listo's
abstract divisions between free will and chance, order and entropy, male
and female, and his equally abstract identifications between past and
present, between life and a certain kind of art, lead to his final deci
sion that the only happy context for him, the only state in which what
he fears will be kept away and what he desires joined to him , is that
of death. My argument, because it is about the relationship between
contexts, w ill call attention to such things as the gender coding of
Callisto's phi losophical concepts, the rhetorical nature of his sexual
beliefs, and the history of his attitudes toward literature. I hope to
demonstrate that it is only by attending to Callisto's interaction with
all these contexts that we can come close to understand ing his actions
in the story, particu larly his decision to commit suicide.'
Callisto negates himsel f in order to beat the forces of negation;
he jumps to conclusions so that he wi ll not have to suffer being pushed.
And this preemptive strike against the self is not only meant to forestall
an attack from the other (what is left of the self for the other to destroy?),
but also to seize for the self the other's power, to place the self in a
position of dominance like that of the other. By " making like" the other,
the self hopes to assimilate its power; by destroying himself ahead of
time, the son tries to wrest the scythe from Father Time.8 The activity
of self-demolition may be the only freedom from passivity before the
other's destructive force; if one has not the strength to live, perhaps
exerting one's will to die will bring a whole new life. If the self must
fail in its attempt at purity because of the constant contamination by
a soiled other, why not permit oneself to be saturated, completely defiled
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so as to acquire the other's transcendent order, wholly corrupted so
as to be broken into a new sense of self-unity?
Having first assumed that the other is all-powerful, one then
assumes the other-absorbs the other's power by being absorbed in
to it. The assumption concerning the other's omnipotence is really one
with the self's desire for absolute power. The self only "sees" the other
through the mirror of its own fear and desire, the fear of being over
taken (by the other, by time) provoking the desire to take over. We could
say that for the self illusion fosters illusion, that idealism produces
nihilism which gives rise to still more idealism: the assumption that
the omniscience and omnipotence lacking to the self inhere in an
"other" 9 leads to the assumption that if one assimilates the other (or,
what amounts to the same thing, if one negates oneself in order to be
assimilated by the other), then one can fill that lack and be whole like
the "other."
But the self must never admit the possibility that it may have
made an unwarranted assumption, that the idealizing categories through
which it views the other may be more of a mirror than a window, more
narcissistic fantasy than self-confirming truth. If the other were truly
other than what the self desires, if the threat it posed to the self were
any less great than that with which the self would want to menace the
other, then how could the self hope to achieve its ideal of omnipotence
through self-annihilation? The masochistic self must believe in the ex
istence of a sadistic other who will impose restraints so severe that
the masochist will be sure of the sadist's power, certain of the omni
potence with which the masochist himself would identify. The self can
turn bondage into freedom; it can rewrite a play in which it has an
assigned part. But uncertainty as to the other's authority frees the self
only to doubt, gives the self the task of revising a play written in a
language the self may not know. Knowledge of one's limits can always
be reconverted into power, but the lack of certainty only reinforces the
self's fear of a basic lack of power. To admit the possibility that one's
knowledge may be limited would thus be to confess to the worst of
possible limitations, for an uncertain limit is like a contest that no one
can win because no one knows the rules, or like an hourglass that can
not be turned over again because one cannot tell when the sand has
run out. In order to maintain its definition of the other as filling for the
self's lack of being, as the transcendental signified to which everything
in the self points, the self must continually deny the possibility that
it may not know the significance of the other: what if the self merely
slips from signifier to signifier without ever finding the locus of power
it seeks? The endless defile of the signifier would be the worst possi
ble defilement of the self's purity of meaning; every time that the self
thinks it has found fulfillment in an other, it may only have discovered
another avoidance of power. To entertain the possibility of a limit to
the self's knowledge is thus to occupy oneself with something that can
not be held in place; to introduce the idea is to admit something that
cannot be taken in if the self is to remain itself: uncertainty about the
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other is truly destructive in that it confounds the self's faith that it knows
itself.
This aversion to an uncertain limit explains why Cal listo in " En
tropy" is so quick to accept a hopelessly pessimistic view of the other
and the future as the truth: strangely, pessimism is his only hope; the
certainty of his total estrangement from both the other and the future
is the closest he can get to grasping them. The possibility that his words
may be inadequate to an understanding of the world, that his negative
reduction of the situation might be just that-a reduction, is barely
raised before being repressed as more dangerous than the certainty
of danger:
He was aware of the dangers of the reductive fallacy
and, he hoped, strong enough not to drift into the
gracefu l decadence of an enervated fatalism. His had
always been a vigorous, Italian sort of pessimism: like
Machiavelli, he allowed the forces of virtu and fortuna
to be about 50/50; but the equations now introduced
a random factor which pushed the odds to some unut
terable and indeterminate ratio which he found himself
afraid to calcu late.[" Entropy:" 87-88/73}' 0
Cal listo goes on to decide that " that constant 37 [degrees Fahrenheit}
was now decisive" (E: 98/85), to determine that because the temperature
outside his window hasn't changed for three days the homogeneity is
now terminal: the universe is dying of entropy. And, in a "sudden" and
decisive blow, Callisto's lover Aubade breaks the window separating
their "Hermetically sealed" room from the " vagaries of the weather,"
their " tiny enclave of regularity" from the "city's chaos" (E: 83-84/68),
so that "37 degrees Fahrenheit should prevail both outside and inside,
and forever" (E: 98/85-86).
Concerned about preserving his " virtu" or viri lity, Callisto never
felt unduly threatened by "fortuna" or lady luck because he always
thought he knew her, that he possessed basic knowledge of the limits
of her power: his " vigorous, Italian sort of pessimism" was more like
a cleverly disgu ised form of optimism; his statement that he " allowed
the forces of virtu and fortuna to be about 50/50" means less that he
admitted the ratio than that he permitted it. But "fortuna" refuses to
accommodate herself to the phallocratic order; against all likelihood,
nature remains at 37 degrees for three days in a row, thus asserting that
she is not merely the mirror of man's desires. By disturbing the male
ratio, she shakes his faith in his ratiocinative powers; an "unutterable
and indeterminate ratio" simply cannot be reasoned with or away. "Afraid
to" speak the name or "calcu late" the force of " fortuna," Call isto is in
danger of having his tongue and counting fingers cut off by the other
sex; suddenly feminine irrationality disrupts the male body. For Callisto,
to "f[i}nd himself afraid to calculate" is to find himself unmanned."
It is just at this point that Callisto commits his most audacious
act-a last, desperate attempt to regain the viri lity he fears to have lost:

219

before " fortuna" can unman him, he castrates himself to show that he
is still the one wielding the knife; before chance can destroy his reason,
he self-destructs to prove that he can comprehend randomness, expect
the unpredictable. Rather than quake before odds that may be worse
than "50150," Callisto stands firm in the belief that he will not survive.
If there is no chance for Callisto, then there is no chance (" fortuna" )
for Callisto: if death can be known, it need not be feared. The smashing
of the window to let " chaos" in to the " Hermetically sealed " room is
merely the physical confirmation of a psychological self-destruction:
before the glass partition is broken and the " vagaries of the weather"
disrupt the controlled " regularity" of the room, Callisto has already
decided that the glass will not hold ("[in] his obsession .. . that cons
tant 37 was now decisive" ). In his imagination of certain destruction
by the other, he has theoretically already committed suicide. The gap
between envisioning one's inevitable destruction and suffering it blindly
is introduced by Callisto as a saving grace (period): as long as he has
time to see the castration by which the member separating him from
a "slhe" will be removed , he can still believe that " he" remains virtual
ly intact; that if his member is taken it is solely by his own permission ;
that his member may be gone but not his membership in the gender
of power.
Calisto thus reduces the complexity of " fortuna," the indeter
minacy of the other and the future, to the fearsome type of a castrating
female because this is the least dangerous figure he can imagine: with
it in mind he will at least have something known against which to take
action, even if precisely what he knows is that there is no worse im
aginable, that there exists nothing so terrible as to be beyond the
bounds of his imagination. Though " He was aware of the dangers of
the reductive fallacy and, he hoped, strong enough not to drift into the
graceful decadence of an enervated fatalism;· Callisto's fatalistic reduc
tion of "fortuna" is actually designed to preserve his phallic potency,
to enable mean ingful action where none before was possible; nature
cannot be beaten at her own game unless man knows the rules; for
Callisto to kill himself now would be senseless if nature were not just
about to usurp his power of self-determination. Cal listo's reductive
phallacy works by assigning the phallus to mother (nature) only so that
he may rec laim it for himself; the omnipotence that he so desires but
fears he lacks is "found" in the other only so that he may take it away.
Callisto's hysteron proteron, his assuming as true what has yet to be
proved (" that constant 37 was now decisive" ) and his placement of the
weaker sex as first in power, is thus a clever attempt to deny that "truth"
and to overturn that "dominance": by defining " power" in his own
polarized terms, Cal listo hopes to assure himself of the poles' rever
sibility; if he can let woman go first, that shows his power as a man.
But Callisto must also hide from himself the phallaciousness
of his reasoning: to believe in his own viri lity he must deny that his view
of woman is merely a male fantasy. If " she" does not possess the
castrating knife, then who will " he" get it from (be castrated by, wrest
power from)? If man's hysteron proteron is merely phallacious, then what
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are the terms of argument by which man can prove his power? Callisto's
reductive phallacy is thus revealed to be a defense against his real
castration anxiety: that woman too may lack the phallus; that the power
man seeks may not be obtainable from her; that man may have been
cut off at birth from the force he wil l never understand or master in life.
Without the phallus fearfully but really hopefully assigned to her by man,
"s/he" is really no other than " he" and will no longer support the illu·
sion of a saving difference. It is significant that the only other that man
will accept is a " s/he" so much more powerful than " he" himself, so
comprehensibly different, that man feels incited to, and can succeed
in, making her power his own. The "s/he" man wants is his exact op
posite; the difference he desires is only the one most like himself, the
one he likes for being the mirror (enlarged) of his (too small) phal lus.
Any asymmetrical difference or incalculable otherness is rejected as
unrecognizable: man cannot find himself in it, cannot refound himself
on surer ground using it as a more stable plan than the original.
Thus Cal listo can countenance a " fortuna" exact ly like him
(" 50/50") or a fortune that is his exact opposite (a one-in-a-million chance
of survival is no " chance" at all), but he cannot face any less certain
figure. Trying to find himself in the other, he prefers a "she" whose
weakness can assure him of his own potency (recall that Cal listo's
pessimistic " 50/50" was real ly a disguised form of optimism), but a
strong "she" wi ll do well if not better for then he can find his face in
her disfiguring power, his phallus in her knife. Whether Callisto is always
at the power-end of the pole or whether he starts in the weak position
the better to jump to the dominant end, the one thing he must believe
is that the pole exists, that there is a difference between himself and
the " other" to be maintained or overcome. If power could not be located
at one end or the other, Callisto would not know how to find it; the real
lack that Callisto's polarizing consciousness works hard to repress is
thus a lack of knowledge, without which power cannot even be iden
tified (defined and made one's own)! 2
We note too that Callisto's movement from a faith in "equal" odds
to a belief in his imminent destruction (and resurrection) is not acciden
tal, but the inevitable effect of his polarizing consciousness, of the way
in which he ses his situation. In order to firm up his flaccid sense of
self-unity, Callisto hardens his defin ition of reason and "regularity" so
as to stand strong against any possible threat from the other. But the
more thoroughly he fortifies himself against the other as a possible
threat, the more likely the other is to look like a threat; the narrower
his terms of survival, the more likely the other wil l appear not to fit but
to chal lenge them. So, whi le Callisto may w ish to keep believing that
"fortuna" occupies the weak end of the pole across from his position
of strength, his own irrepressible fear of weakness will continue to make
"fortuna" look stronger and stronger unti l the odds against him appear
overwhelming, at which point he has no choice but to hasten the self·
destruction through which he can identify with her power. The more
Cal listo self-protectively emphasizes his difference from " fortuna," the
more that very difference undermines his attempt at self-identity, finally
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forcing him to identify with precisely that from which he had originally
tried to maintain a difference. The self's polarizing consciousness is
thus self-defeating or, as Callisto hopes, the way to self-fu lfillment
through identification with the other that the self desires. If you can't
beat 'em, join 'em as a way of beating them; the other with her threaten·
ing difference can be seen as likable if she proves by defeating man
to have the power that man wants.
This dynamic of an increasing (imagined) polarization resulting
in a final (imagined) unity operates on several levels in " Entropy": be·
tween Callisto and " fortuna," Callisto and Aubade, Callisto and the bird
he shelters. Just as Callisto's extraordinary desire for survival leads to
a proportionately extreme fear of mortality, so his self-defensively strict
definition of life (order, reason) makes even the most minor deviations
from his norm appear as chaos and irrationality. " The cosmologists had
predicted an eventual heat-death for the universe (something like Lim·
bo: form and motion abolished, heat-energy identical at every point in
it)" (E: 85/69), but Callisto's fear of this eventuality is so strong that every
sign that might point to its coming seems to confirm its occurrence
now. So desirous is Callisto of ensuring the preservation of his space
in time that he ends up cornering himself in a " Hermetically sealed"
room and blinding himself to a future any different from his past (for
him, after three days "that constant 37 was now decisive"). The great
irony of Callisto's polarizing consciousness is that in its attempt to
secure space and time it ends up displacing itself to narrower and nar
rower confines whi le terminating its vision of the future to ever shorter
periods. The resu lt of this drive for position and persistence is a feel
ing that there is no time left, no space that can be defended from at·
tack by the other. In fact, Callisto's need for spatio-temporal security
is so extreme that he can only see space (true otherness) and time (an
unpredictable future) themselves as enemies. The self's only way to
security thus becomes self-destruction, the transcendence of al l limita·
tion through identifying with the very power to delimit.
Because Callisto cannot accept the " vagaries of the weather"
as compatible with or even necessary to the regulation of " order" in
his room, because he can only see " fortuna" as "chaos" rather than
as a likable or saving difference, he is doomed to usher in the entropy
he so fears, to " abolish" his own " form and motion," eradicate his own
space and time, in an imitative identification with the supposedly
destructive forces of nature. Although he knows that without the in·
troduction of a saving difference entropy will only increase ("the isolated
system-galaxy, engine, human being, culture, whatever-must evolve
spontaneously toward the Condition of the More Probable" [E: 87/72-73D,
it is precisely Cal listo's narrow definition of what constitutes "differen·
tiation" and "ordered individuality" that brings on the "sameness" and
"chaos" he fears (E: 88/74): by differentiating himself so thoroughly from
the other, by viewing all otherness as a threatening difference, he
isolates his own system from any beneficial change. Cal listo's extreme
ideal of order is chaos: any system that cuts itself off from all outside
influence in an attempt to become absolutely self-sufficient inevitably
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self-destructs; for a structure to survive, for any order to be maintained,
there must be an interdependence of parts. For this reason Callisto's
efforts to cut himself off from " that constant 37" as if he could thereby
excise the very threat of sameness, as if the process of entropy were
a thing that could be cut out, only results in his own muti lation, in an
organism so " self-identical" that it is wholly disorganized and cannot
survive. In trying to differ/defer the possibly negative effects of space
and time, Callisto ends up estranging himself from himself: he becomes
the very (dis)embodiment of the destructive process which he had tried
to reify and remove as the " other." The on ly way that Callisto can find
to fend off ill fortune and come into his own (lady luck) is to kil l the
very ego that desires and fears, to abolish the spatio-temporal difference
that sustained his attraction and repulsion. Callisto's liebestod with " for
tuna" is thus the realization of entropy: " heat-energy identical at every
point." His polarizing consciousness destroys the material world in an
attempt to bring it into unity.
The attraction-repulsion between Callisto and his lover Au bade
mirrors that between the man and Mistress Fortune. Neither wife nor
stranger, Aubade makes love with Callisto even as she keeps her
distance, desiring meaningfu l contact but always suspicious of the
other's meaning, wanting fulfillment but afraid of any " threat" to her
carefully guarded " purity":
The architecton ic purity of her world was constantly
threatened by such hints of anarchy: gaps and ex
crescences and skew lines, and a shifting or tilting of
planes to which she had continually to readjust lest
the whole structure shiver into a disarray of discrete
and meaningless signals. Callisto had described the
process once as a kind of " feedback": she crawled into
dreams each night with a sense of exhaustion, and a
desperate resolve never to relax that vigilance. Even
in the brief periods when Callisto made love to her,
soaring above the bowing of taut nerves in haphazard
double-stops wou ld be the one singing string of her
determination. [E: 88/73-74]
Desiring to form a new whole with Callisto, Aubade is nevertheless afraid
that the attempt will merely destroy her own integrity. The movement
of their bodies in love is thus fearfully imagined as a " shifting and tilting
of planes to which she had continually to readjust," as " haphazard
double-stops" (two notes produced simultaneously on a string instru
ment by drawing the bow over two strings at the same time) which con
stantly threaten her "determination" to remain at " one" with herself.
Neither a new creature composed of herself and Callisto nor herself
alone, Aubade is caught between structures, feeling the loss of her
orig inal unity even as she reaches to draw the other into a new whole.
But intercourse for Aubade can only go so far: her narrow definition
of integrity makes love the eruption of " gaps" in her otherwise perfect
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intactness; like the ravaging effects of wind and weather, Callisto's
desire to join with her only seems to disturb her attempt at self
monumentalization. " That precious signal-to-noise ratio, whose delicate
balance" Au bade feels she must keep is as defensively strict in its defini
tion of " noise" (meaningless and thus potentially harmful signals from
the other [E: 92/79]) as Callisto's own "ratio" of odds regarding "for
tuna": Au bade's anxiety about Callisto as an embod iment of disorder,
a form-splitting motion, matches Callisto's fear of " fortuna" as a
castrating female who wou ld have/halve his orig inal wholeness.' 3 Like
Callisto, Aubade needs to "reduce" the element of chance in her life
to the security of a foregone conclusion: she will only receive the other
on her " terms," defining the whole they form together in her way: " the
accidental fingers at the small of her back or feathery against her
breasts came to her reduced inevitably to the terms of sound: of music
which emerged at intervals from a howling darkness of discordancy"
(E: 84/69). Yet Aubade's terms are so rigid they can never be met: there
can be no real intercourse between her and Callisto because her ex
treme fear of disorder makes sexual contact with him seem like the
introduction of randomness itself, like a fatal submission to the " ac
cidental" or " haphazard" that would destroy her very sense of self.
If Aubade can on ly read Callisto's input as incomprehensible,
can only see adjustment to him as assimilation by him, it should not
be surprising that Callisto finds himself in exactly the same position
of confusion or negative ambivalence regarding her: each sees not the
other, but the externalization of the self's own fear of externality, of be
ing beside itself; each fears being taken in, not so deeply inside a
sheltering ot her that one feels secure from outside attack, but into the
other-as-outside, into the very marginalization that one was trying to
avoid. If the " Callisto" that Au bade " sees" is the result of a certain fear
fu l aestheticization of life whereby her lover becomes an opener of
" gaps" which threaten her " architectonic purity" or a maker of " noise"
which disturbs her musical solo, then Callisto's "Aubade" is likewise
a figure of art, a projection of Callisto's own fears as these are given
form (and content?) by music and literature. Call isto " finds " his mistress
between the covers of a book, "experiences" the meaninglessness of
her love through the words of Faulkner, Djuna Barnes, and Henry Miller;
the strange choreography to Stravinsky's music dictates the movement
toward estrangement in his own relationship with Aubade:
Callisto was trying to confront any idea of the heat
death now.. .. He sought correspondences. Sade, of
course. And Temple Drake, gaunt and hopeless in her
little park in Paris, at the end of [Faulkner's] Sanctuary.
Final equilibrium. [Barnes'] Nightwood. And the tango.
Any tango, but more than any perhaps the sad sick
dance in Stravinsky's L'Histoire du Soldat. He thought
back: what had tango music been for them after the
war, what meanings had he missed in all the stately
coupled automatons in the cafes-dansants, or in the
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metronomes which had ticked behind the eyes of his
own partners? .... Stravinsky had managed to com
municate in that tango the same exhaustion, the same
airlessness one saw in the slicked-down youths who
were trying to imitate Vernon Castle, and in their
mistresses, who simply did not care. Ma maitresse.
Celeste. Returning to Nice after the second war he had
found that cafe replaced by a perfume shop which
catered to American tourists. And no secret vestige
of her in the cobblestones or in the old pension next
door; no perfume to match her breath heavy with the
sweet Spanish wine she always drank. And so instead
he had purchased a Henry Miller novel and left for
Paris, and read the book on the train so that when he
arrived he had been given at least a little forewarning.
And saw that Celeste and the others and even Temple
Drake were not all that had changed. [E: 92-93/79·80]
Callisto's modernist literary fathers pass their apocalyptism on to their
postmodern reader-son, who seems more than ready to receive their
evil tidings. The cultural parents in this passage transmit to Calisto a
pessimistic way of seeing, a negative formal reduction of a world in
otherwise uncertain motion:• Whether art imitates life or life, art it would
be hard to say, for just as the "sad sick dance in Stravinsky's L'Histoire
du Soldat' ' was written to express the real horrors of World War I, so
the real-life cafe dancer "Vernon Castle" and his partner Irene press
their bodies into the form of a sad sick dance, and just as more live
"youths" and their "mistresses" try to imitate Castle and his partner
in their dance, so novels are written with characters modeled on these
hopeless couples. Life and art "correspond;' each confirming the other
in a fear that the twentieth century is running down, becoming increas·
ingly disordered or entropic. Callisto and his "maitresse. Celeste" merely
extend the terrible rhyme between art and life up through World War
II and into the present day, where Callisto and Aubade reduplicate the
pattern.'5
If Aubade attempts to live her art's narrow conception of formal
purity, fearing Callisto's touching "fingers" as " accidental " and his
sliding body as "haphazard" as if contact with him meant succumb·
ing to the destructive force of randomness itself, then Callisto also
brings strict modernist standards of aesthetic order into his judgment
of life, rejecting any real connection with Aubade as if passion meant
passivity before the entropic force she embodies. Once he has inter
nalized the modernists' vision of an imminent apocalypse, love can no
longer be seen in an unquestionably positive tight: " He was forced,
therefore, in the sad dying fall of middle age, to a radical reevaluation
of everything he had learned up to then; all the cities and seasons and
casual passions of his days had now to be looked at in a new and elusive
light" (E: 87/73). Love itself comes to seem like a fall into death; "casual
passions," like "accidental fingers," threaten to make the self an acci
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dent or casualty of the other's destructive force. Reading Aubade
through Faulkner and the other modernists, Cal listo sees a " Temple
Drake, Gaunt and hopeless" after being raped by power beyond her con·
trol; he sees Aubade as one of the " mistresses, who simply did not care,"
like his " maitresse. Celeste" who left or died before he could return
to find her. To make love with Au bade " means" to become one of those
"coupled automatons" whose every move is not the coming together
that each desires, but a prechoreographed dance of death d ictated by
forces beyond their control. Seeing Au bade through art " means" see·
ing through Au bade to the dire truth behind deceptively attractive ap
pearances, to the " metronome" of death relent lessly " tick[ing] behind
[her] eyes." The uncertainty of the living, moving Au bade is formed by
Call isto's artistic vision into the certainty of stasis, the "idea" of " heat·
death:' Modernist paranoia about the death of the world prefigures
Callisto's fear of Aubade, molds her face into a death mask and forecasts
his love of her as necrophilia.
In their attempt to define love so as to be certain of its saving
power, the modernists only succeed in discovering the inextricable con
nection between love and death ; the more they insist upon securing
themselves against disorder, the more love itself begins to look like
disorder:
Henry Adams, three generations before his own , had
stared aghast at Power; Callisto found himself now in
much the same state over Thermodynamics, the inner
life of that power, realizing like his predecessor that
the Virgin and the dynamo stand as much for love as
for power; that the two are indeed identical; and that
love therefore not only makes the world go round but
also makes the boccie ball spin, the nebula precess.
It was this latter or sidereal element which disturbed
hi m [E: 84-85/69]
In Callisto's fearful reading, the very mot ion that sustains form, that
supports life on earth, must also destroy it; " love" or the earth's attrac·
tion to the sun results in a transfer of heat necessary for the continuance
of life, but also leads to the climactic end of all transference, the
equilibrium of " heat-death:' In being drawn toward its source of required
heat-energy, the earth simultaneously decreases the difference in
temperature needed to maintain its own form of life.
Like Aubade's notion of monumental stability, Callisto's
modernist-inspired ideal of formal purity needs motion to complete it
yet fears motion as depletion; outside energy is always desired to fill
an insatiable sense of lack, but such energy is also feared as moving
the self toward ultimate emptiness: when all the outside has been taken
in, where can the constitutional ly needy self look for fulfillment? The
difference between self and other that love encourages Callisto to over·
come in order to achieve fulfillment is also the difference that cannot
be conquered if the forever self-doubting Callisto is always to have some
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new virgin from whom to gain a temporary sense of potency. Just as
the earth's attraction to the sun, a movement that might be taken as
the primary sign of life, can only appear as a death drive in the eyes
of modernists who crave absolute security, so the love that Callisto is
offered looks like death to one for whom every transfer of heat only
increases a fear of the end of al l transference, every distance crossed
and bit of time elapsed only portends the crossing out of space and
the running out of ti me.
Cal listo's desire is thus self-thwarting in that his every hopefu l
movement toward a love-object is countered by a fear of motion itself:
to attempt to bridge the gap between self and other is not only to ad·
mit that there exists a gap that may be unbridgeable, but also to con·
front the possibility that that gap may indeed be bridged, that in
eliminating differences one may abolish differentiation itself. Cal listo
desires a successful transfer of heat between himself and the other
(assuring him of his potency) or between the other and himself (filling
him with power), but his irrepressible fear that any motion will destroy
form, that all transference or love tends toward nondifferentiation or
death, makes every attempt at communication a self-confirming
prophecy of fai lure. The Cal listo who shelters a sick bird in his arms,
trying to " give it warmth" and make it " well again" (E: 83/68), is the same
sick man whose " fingers pressed the bird more firmly, as if needing
some pulsing or suffering assurance of an early break in the
temperature" (E: 85/70). Callisto does not know where the source of heat·
energy can be found, in himself or in the other, inside or outside; his
great fear is that every potentially salubrious outside is really already
a dead inside, and vice versa. No prospective love coming to or from
him can override his fear of the coming of the end, of coming as the
end. Callisto's inability to settle for anything less than absolute cer·
tainty as to the locus of power makes any mere attempt at a transfer
of energy seem fruitless; unable to tolerate the possibility of failure,
Callisto ends up ensuring the necessity of failure, assuring himself that
the assurance he seeks can be found nowhere.
Significant ly, it is while he is lost in his reading of the despair·
ing modernists that his situation suddenly becomes hopeless; think·
ing so hard about past failures to communicate, he fails to connect in
the present: " Callisto, he I pless in the past, did not feel the faint rhythm
inside the bi rd begin to slacken and fail" (E: 97/84). Callisto's past
reading predetermines his present (lack of) life. The bird's " heartbeat
tick[ing] a gracefu l diminuendo down at last into stillness" (E: 97/85)
is prefigured, preordained by the modern ists' image of the "metronome"
of death " tick[ing] behind the eyes" of any potential " partner" in love.
The modernists to whom he turned for his supposedly saving idea of
order make his every experience look hopelessly entropic. The more
information the self feels it needs before it can safely join with the other,
the less likely it is that that joining w ill occur. The desire for absolute
confirmation of the other's compatibility destroys the very possibility
of communication that it was supposed to substantiate. The heat-energy
expended on gathering information about the other leaves too little left
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for an effective transfer. Aubade's attempt to ensure that the " signals"
and the " noise" in a potential relationship with Callisto would be balanc
ed according to an acceptable " ratio" burns up all the energy she might
have preserved if she had been less fearful of communicating with him,
just as Callisto's effort to save the bird from a present " heat-death" by
trying to understand how others in "correspond[ing]" situations have
dealt with the threat only wastes in a hopeless search for an infallible
source of information the energy he might have devoted to warming
the bird:
That precious signal-to-noise ratio, whose delicate
balance required every calorie of [Au bade's) strength,
seesawed inside the small tenuous skull as she
watched Call isto, sheltering the bird . Callisto was try
ing to confront any idea of the heat-death now, as he
nuzzled the feathery Jump in his hands. He sought cor
respondences. . .. Callisto, helpless in the past, did not
feel the faint rhythm inside the bird begin to slacken
and fail. [E: 92-93, 97/79, 84]
There are thus two ways in which Callisto is " helpless in the
past" having spent so much energy looking to the past in an effort to
gather enough information about "heat-death" that he can be sure to
defeat it, Callisto is left with too little energy to fight the battle that
counts-the one in the present; and having allowed the despairing
modern ists to shape his understanding of the postmodern condition,
Callisto has doomed himsel f to repeat their past helplessness. Past
thinkers only confirm Callisto in his belief that complete knowledge
of " heat-death" is required before the self can safely fight it. In giving
him th is "answer" to his quest- they insist he must keep looking for
more and better answers - the modernists effectively solve Callisto's
problem by proving it insoluble: once he knows that he' ll never know
enough about " heat-death" to be sure of defeating it, then he knows
that there is no answer but death, nothing but to be defeated by it. The
endlessness of Callisto's search becomes its only end: because he feels
he needs more information about the present, Call isto looks to the past
which , instead of directing him back toward the present, toward living
with the uncertainty of hope, merely extends his search indefinitely,
thus providing him with certain hopelessness. Rather than think that
the answer cannot be found in the past, Callisto takes its un locatabili·
ty as the answer, as evidence of a negative result. The two ways in which
Callisto is " helpless in the past" are thus mutually reinforcing: expend·
ing energy on the past in order to gain information about the present
yields only information about the uselessness of past expenditures of
energy; the modernists merely reinforce the same fear of insufficient
information that Callisto had gone to them to relieve. Callisto's search
both finds examples, and is itself an example, of the useless expen
diture of energy; it finds examples because it is an example (since he
would never have looked to the past if he had felt that the present pro
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vided him with enough information, Callisto is already pred isposed to
consider whatever information he receives to be inadequate) and it is
an example because it finds examples (since Callisto only considers
information about past thinkers who have wasted their time, his own
consideration is bound to be a waste of time).
Information about others and the past is supposed to help
Callisto save the bird, Aubade, and himself in the present; expending
energy to gain knowledge is necessary to ensure a usefu l expenditure
of energy in a successful transfer of heat (Cal listo needs some idea
of where the heat-source is before he can transfer it, of what "heat·
death" is before he can combat it). But there is a limit to the amount
of energy at Cal listo's disposal; there is a point of diminishing returns
beyond which the energy spent on knowledge becomes less a prere
quisite for than a preclusion of the energy needed for action.'6 For
Callisto knowledge and action are at odds, not only because his endless
search for total knowledge voids the energy he must have to act (his
means preclude his end), but also because the kind of knowledge
Callisto seeks is really incompatible with action. The greater Callisto's
fear of failure if he attempts a transfer of heat, the greater his desire
for complete information about where to find heat and where it should
go. In fact, the only kind of knowledge that would provide Callisto with
the absolute guarantee of success that his fear demands is the
transcendental knowledge of God, the wisdom of One who sees al l
because He is above time and beyond space. But the transfer of heat
that Callisto would effect is within time and space, between live bodies.
Callisto demands an otherworld ly knowledge before he will act in this
world, but in order to gain heavenly wisdom he must already have given
up hope of worldly action; to know the effect of any attempted transfer
of heat between bodies in time he must already have stepped outside
the limited perspective of his own body and time. The ab-solute
knowledge that is meant to ensure the continuing interdependence of
bodies could only be achieved independent of the body; Callisto cou ld
ensure that he would remain a part of everyth ing else only if he were
apart from everything else. For Callisto to sez it all at once, either he
must have removed himself from the motion (the transfer of heat) he
would effect, or everything else must have stopped moving, in which
case it wou ld be too late for any t ransfer of heat. Either way, the total
knowledge he seeks can only come at the end rather than renew the
beginning of himself or the world. Callisto's failure to see the incom
patibi lity between total knowledge and worldly action is closely tied
to his failure to recognize the point of diminishing returns at which he
must stop looking for more information or risk not having enough energy
left to act: his inability to see that absolute knowledge must always
be cut off from earth ly interaction is the mirror of his fai lure to realize
that worldly knowledge must always be connected with world ly action.
There is no exact science of thermodynamics, only limited information
that fallible scientists try to put to act ive use.
In each of these relationships, then, Callisto fails to find the
openness necessary for communication; instead, he merely finds
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repeated his own fearfu l impermeability. The past to which he turns for
help in his road-blocked present becomes less a detour than a dead
end: the modernists reflect back to Callisto his own despairing face
and make communication with the bird in the present seem impossi
ble. Instead of opening up possibi lities for present action, the past limits
the present to more of the same, defines the postmodern as a repeti 
tion of modern failure. Callisto wants to use the modernists as a medium
by which to reach the bird; he would put his faith in a space-time con
tinuum where going back in time might help him cross a space in the
present. But Callisto's fearful journey into the past abolishes both space
and time: from his correspondence with the modernists he " learns"
of every self's repeated failure to correspond with any other; from his
movement back in time he "discovers" that there has never been time
for movement, that there has never been movement in time. Present
and future attempts w ill be no different from past failures to cross space;
every attempt at a successfu l transfer of heat will always be too late
to succeed . Cal listo's journey back thus ends in the timelessness of
an end lessly repeated fai lure to communicate, in the nowhere of a self
that cannot find its own place because it lacks any relationship with
a defining other.
What I have tried to show in the above argument is that the
mediating structures Callisto uses in his effort to communicate are the
obstacles to communication . Each time he turns to another context
for help in escaping the binary divisions of a previous thought-structure,
he merely " finds " those divisions repeated and exacerbated. The divi
sion in science, as Callisto understands it, between o rder and chaos
is only made to seem more hopelessly irresolvable when Callisto tries
to deal with it in philosophical terms. When the order-and chaos binary
is aligned with the split between free will and determinism, and when
fear and desire begin their predictable operation on the polarity they
themselves created, Callisto's fear of a predetermined chaos gradually
overwhel ms any faith in a will to order, and he finally comes to believe
that the on ly possible exercise of free will open to him is to bring chaos
upon himself, just as the only way in which he can assert his order on
the world is to identify that order with the chaos he fears is predeter
mined. Science and phi losophy (or Callisto's understanding of them)
only inform - rigid ify and seem to lend authority to- the polarities of
Callisto's consciousness; every new context in which Callisto finds
himself placed (or places himself) proves to have the same binary divi
sions pointing to the same suicidal end.
By thinking of will or " virtu" as male like himself, Callisto tries
to appropriate the power that he so desires, but the metaphor backfires:
his investment in polarized gender categories brings with it a fear of
the same women he had originally desired to protect with his power.
Unable to believe that maleness alone guarantees power, Callisto is ter
rified by the thought that power is exclusively female, that only women
have the power. Sexual intercourse thus becomes a threat and the on
ly way in which he can imagine joining w ith the terrible female princ i
ple in nature (" fortuna") or with his female lover (Abuade) is to identify
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with thei r power over him by destroying himself. Both Callisto and
Aubade turn to art as a model for life, but " find" instantiated there the
same formal divisions each was trying to move beyond in their relation·
ship together. The stark antithesis between artistic order and the chaos
of life repeats itself in their lives as an impossible choice between a
lonely self-unity and a self-destructive togetherness. In the end, the only
way they can find to join the stability of form and the human warmth
of emotion is to destroy themselves, thus (they hope) leaving beh ind
all the hopelessly binary artistic, sexual, philosophcal, and scientific
divisions of this world and entering another where al l is one: after
smashing the window to let chaos in, Aubade " turned to face [Callisto]
and wait with him until the moment of equilibrium was reached, when
37 degrees Fahrenheit should prevai l both outside and inside, and
forever, and the hovering, curious dominant of their separate lives should
resolve into a tonic of darkness and the final absence of all motion"
(E: 98/85·86).

At the end as throughout the story, Pynchon describes his
characters' thoughts and actions in terms of the contexts in which those
characters live. Cal listo and Au bade think of their suicide as a triumph
over the divisive categories of the very contexts to which they had turned
for help in dealing with division: order and entropy, free will and deter
minism, male and female will be joined at last; each character will have
the stability of a work of art and at the same time each wi ll be one with
the other. In abolishing their own form and motion, space and time,
these characters try to identify with the power- whatever it is-that
created these divisions in the first place and can presumably reun ite
them at will. Unable to discover this power in any one of life's contexts,
they assume that it must lie beyond life and death, in the context of
contexts, and their final act of self-destruction is intended to lift them
out of al l of life's polarizing and hence limiting contexts to join the one
true source of knowledge and power.
Pynchon's narrator stays very close to Cal listo's and Aubade's
perspective in the sections of the story dealing with these characters,
particularly at the end, so it is surprising that no critic has ever argued
that there might be some real connection between the characters'
despairing attitude toward life's contexts and the attitude of Pynchon
the author! 7 Of course " Entropy" is also the story of Meatball Mu lligan,
who is able to achieve some kind of workable relationship between op
posing forces, and critics have understandably sought to find Pynchon's
own attitude there, in the positive results that can come from hard work.
But the fact remains that the story ends with Cal listo and with his
perspective. Critics who discounted this fact upon fi rst reading have
reacted with dismay and outright disbelief at Pynchon's own statements
about the meaning of his story, made recently in his " Introduction" to
Slow Learner. There Pynchon consistently links his own att itudes at
the ti me he wrote the story with those of- not Mulligan, but Callisto.
Pynchon even goes so far as to say that his own apocalyptism reduced
Callisto to someth ing less than a fully human character and that this
was Pynchon's own fau lt as an inexperienced author:
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A pose I found congenial in those days- fairly com
mon, I hope, among pre-adults-was that of somber
glee at any idea of mass destruction or decline. The
modern political thri ller genre, in fact, has been known
to cash in on such visions of death made large-scale
or glamorous. Given my undergraduate mood, Adams's
sense of power out of control, coupled with [Norbert]
Wiener's spectacle of universal heat-death and
mathematical stillness, seemed just the ticket. But the
distance and grandiosity of this led me to short-change
the humans in the story. I think they come off as syn
thetic, insufficiently alive.'8
Richard Poirier, generally one of Pynchon's most sympathetic and
perceptive critics, is completely taken aback; in a disappointed essay
mockingly titled " Humans," Poirier can't help but see Pynchon as his
own worst critic:
[Pynchon's] jaunty complaints in the Introduction that
the stories in Slow Learner fail to provide full, lifelike
characters are .. . so curious and irrelevant as to sug
gest that he is kidding - and I am afraid he isn't - or
that he is tired . . . . What " humans" can he be talking
about? Their absence, their " short changing" of
themselves is precist'liY the point of the story. To com
plain about it is to miss the point. .. . It is obvious that
it is not Pynchon but [his main character] who is
" literary" [and " scienti fic" and otherwise overly in
fluenced by categories] . . . and that even he
recognises how much he thereby loses of direct
human feeling and experience.'9
But does Callisto short-change himsel f or is he short-changed
by the categories to which he turns for help? Does the fault lie in his
character and in what he makes of his contexts, or in those contexts
themselves, the only ones available to Callisto for the formation of his
character? In my essay I have continually returned to the question of
whether Callisto sees on ly what he is predisposed to find, or finds on
ly what there is to see. Poirier, in flatly stating that Call isto short-changes
himself, seems to me to miss the point of the story, to oversimplify the
complex relationship between character and context. As I hope to have
shown, Pynchon does more in " Entropy" than merely condemn Callisto
for his inabi lity to read correctly, to find in the philosophical, scientific,
sexual, and literary contexts which surround him some way of healing
the divisions in his life. And neither the story nor the " Introduction"
to Slow Learner shows Pynchon to have a naive belief in the possibiltiy
of " direct" or un mediated " human feeling and experience." The " In
troduction" reveals Pynchon, like Cal listo, to have spent perhaps " too
much time and energy on words alone," 20 but not as having given up
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reading science, philosophy, or the OED in favor of some search for
"direct" experience. The " Introduction" shows Pynchon, like Callisto,
as having sometimes forgotten to check the facts in his fiction against
the facts in other fiction (Pynchon mistook "grippe espagnole"[Spanish
influenza] for someth ing much more apocalyptic),21 but not as having
lost all faith in combining scientific and literary contexts in an attempt
to understand the world.
Perhaps what Pynchon has said about another work of fiction
can help us understand what he wanted to say about character and con
text in " Entropy." In reviewing a novel by his friend Oakley Hal l, Pyn
chon directs us away from placing the whole of our blame on either
one side or the other, character or context:
Tombstone, Arizona, during the 1880's is, in ways, our
national Camelot: a never-never land where American
virtues are embodied in the Earps, and the opposite
evils in the Clanton gang; where the confrontation at
the OK Corral takes on some of the dry purity of an
Arthurian joust. Oakley Hall, in his very fine novel
Warlock (Viking) has restored to the myth of Tombstone
its full, mortal , blooded humanity. Wyatt Earp is
transmogrified into a gunfighter named Blaisdel l who,
partly because of his blown-up image in the Wild West
magazines of the day, believes he is a hero. He is sum
moned to the embattled town of Warlock by a commit
tee of nervous citizens expressly to be a hero, but finds
that he cannot, at last, live up to this image; that there
is a flaw not on ly in him but also, we feel, in the entire
set of assumptions that have allowed the image to
exist. It is Blaisdell 's private abyss, and not too dif
ferent from the town's public one. 22
What Pynchon has tried to do in " Entropy" is to demonstrate precisely
why Callisto's private abyss is " not too different" from our public one,
why the " f law" in his character is also a " flaw . . . in the entire set of
assumptions that have allowed the image [Callisto has constructed of
himself] to exist." If Callisto believes that he must be the virtuous hero
combatting evi l entropy, this is " partly [and only partly] because" he
has made the mistake of reading books that polarize reality into
simplistic categories of good and evil, but also partly because he senses
rightly that other people really expect him to play that role (" He is sum
moned to the embattled town of Warlock by a committee of nervous
citizens expressly to be a hero" ). The binary thinking to which Callisto
is predisposed is also-and not just coincidentally- the only kind of
thinking to which every context predisposes him; the simplistic opposi
tion between good and evil that one finds in a political thriller or western
myth is " not too different" from the polarized categories that one finds
everywhere in " real" people's perceptions - scientific, philosophical,
and sexual-of " real" life.
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Critics who blame Callisto for short-changing himself not on ly
miss the fact that Callisto's contexts are also to blame, but repeat the
same simplistic and deadly division into "good guys" and " bad guys"
"Callisto is the one at fault" -for which they are blaming Callisto. Critics
who suggest that all Callisto has to do is to get beyond the mediating
influence of categories and find some "direct human feeling and ex
perience" repeat the same mistake made by Callisto and other unques
tioning adherents to one point of view- the mistake of believing that
what they see is the unvarnished - unmediated- truth about the world
and not just one perspective among the many others possible. It takes
a belief in the possibility of unmediated experience for critics to be so
sure that they are right about just who or what is at fault in "Entropy,"
about who is short-changing whom.
Pynchon's story, with its constant movement from character to
context and back again, emphasizing how the one influences the other
and vice versa, is intended to dispel this "never-never land" of critical
certainty about right and wrong, good and evil. To be " human," as Pyn
chon understands it, is to be required to form one's character within
certain contexts, to see the world through particular perspect ives. The
mistake he fears he made in his depiction of Callisto's character is in
underestimating Cal listo's ability to be less a " synthesi[s]" of others'
views and more " a liv[ing]" human being with some free will to move
among the various contexts and categories available to him without
adhering completely and forever to any one of them: "[I] short-change[d)
the humans in the story. I think they come off as synthetic, insufficiently
alive." 23 " Entropy," Pynchon says, is itself too much like the " political
thrillers" he was reading at the time: the story shows Pynchon just
beginning to question his characters' unquestioning adherence to cer
tain views of the world, just beg inning to real ize that he as an author
can advocate a necessary but provisional belief in categories not only
by showing the terrible fate of characters who believe too much in any
particular set of oppositions, but also by creating characters who, like
himself as author, can move in and out of contexts without placing
themselves-or finding themselves placed-in any one. 2'
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(spoken or tacit) bidding and that it mirrors, in all its complexity, Callisto's own
desire for a " self-destructive liberation." Aubade is like the Empty Ones In
Gravity's Rainbow, colonized blacks who have incorporated their oppressors '
complex of destructive I self-destructive tendencies and have embarked on a
program of racial suicide I revenge.
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We can see another way in which Cal listo and Au bade mirror each other
as colonist and colonized if we consider Michael Ryan's definition of colonialism
as a kind of narcissism in which the "ego" feels "jubilation at apprehending an
image of its own power" (Ryan, "Self·De{con]struction," Diacritics 6.1. [1976]: 36).
Callisto tries to dominate the other (woman: fortuna and Aubade) In order to
assure himself of his own power, but the idea that the other may lack power on·
ly makes the sti ll uncertain Callisto fear that he himself has the same lack, so
he ends up projecting complete power onto it/her ("Since [the child 's tear of]
the mother's lack of a pen is initiates the chi ld 's castration anxiety, he protects
himself by denying her castration .. . . The child disavows the mother's lack of
a phallus, her castration which, by implication, is his own, by being the phallus
tor her [or by assigning the phal lus to herr -Ryan 35). Aubade's narcissism mir·
rors Callisto's: like him she cannot tolerate any breach in the wholeness of her
body (power), so she identifies with-by obeying-the power of her master
Callisto, and when his strength gives out before opposing forces, she lets those
forces engulf her (she smashes the window) in order to identify with them.
14

The apocalyptism of the major modernist (and not only modernist) writers and
critics, stemming from their paranoid opposition between artistic " order" and
the "chaos " of life, receives perhaps its fullest discussion In Frank Lentricchia's
After the New Criticism (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980).

15

David Seed's neat formulation of the problem- ·•callisto seems to be suffering
from a hand-me-down pessimism, an ersatz g loom without any roots in his own
experience" (Seed, 143)-is just too simple: although Pynchon obviously means
to imply that Callisto is in some sense reading about life rather than " seeing"
it for himself, Pynchon Is too aware of the fact that every view of life is struc·
tured through some context ever to suggest that all Callisto needs is some
unmediated experience. As I indicate at the end of this essay, I think Pynchon
suggests, by emphasizing the danger of adhering to a single thought-structure,
that we play one context off another without fixing on any one as the absolute
truth , but using each for what it has to offer-here and now.

16

Readers familiar with Pynchon will recognize that he Is here is alluding to the
Maxwell-Brillouin controversy: whereas the physicist Clerk Maxwell maintained
the possibility of a perpetual -motion machine kept going by a subject who com
batted entropy by sorting the machine's molecules into their proper places, Leon
Brillouin argued that the energy expended by the subject to determine which
molecules were where wou ld leave too little energy left for sorting those
molecules and that a perpetual-motion machine was thus Impossible.

17

Joseph Tabbi and David Seed, for example, who have written two of the most
recent and most perceptive essays on " Entropy," either draw too simple a con
trast between Callisto's and Pynchon's attitudes (Tabbi) or can find nothing but
irresolvable ambiguity in the story (Seed). Tabbi: " Au bade and Callisto exhaust
their creative energies in trying to preserve the delicate balance and self·
enclosure of their isolated world. Pynchon as a writer, however, Incorporates
these motifs of merging orders into the structure of his narrative, and in so do·
ing avoids the kinds of static and enclosed perception that Adams so thoroughly
criticises. Pynchon at the outset was working to create an imaginative order in
art that could engage randomness and indeterminacy in modern life and in the
changing physical world" (Tabbi, "Merging Orders: The Shaping Influence of
Science on ' Entropy,' " Pynchon Notes 15 [1984]: 67).
Seed: " Formall y speaking the story has begun from rest and comes back
to it at the end. In that sense It seems satisfyingly symmetrical. But, because
music is a non-conceptual medium, the use of music to create form in the story
does not carry with it any epistemological implications.... "Entropy" examines
various notions of order and disorder in such a way as to make it very difficult
to locate Pynchon's own view-point. Music is of course non-verbal and so an ideal
means of binding his story together without committing himself to any one view·
point. .. . Pynchon's story forces a relativistic view-point on to the reader, which
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acts against a final resolving certainty, or one definite moral direction" (Seed
150·51).
18

Pynchon, Slow Learner 13/xxili.

19

Richard Poirier, " Humans:· rev. of Slow Learner, by Thomas Pynchon, London
Review of Books 24 Jan. 1985: 18.·19. Poirier's last comment ("It is obvious that
it is not Pynchon . . . ." )actually refers to another Pynchon short story, "The Small
Rain," but the statement is right in line with his preceding comments on "En·
tropy" and hence equally applicable to that story. Like al l of Poirier's work as
a critic, his essay " Humans" is extremely complex, and I am aware that I do him
some injustice by excerpting even a passage this long from the whole of his
essay.

20

Pynchon, Slow Learner 15/xxv.

21

" I must have thought this (grippe espagnole] was some kind of post.World War
I spiritual malaise or something" (Pynchon, Slow Learner 16/xxvi).

22

Pynchon, rev. of Warlock, by Oakley Hall, Holiday 38.6 (1965): 164·65.

23

Pynchon, Slow Learner 13/xxiii.

24

Tyrone Slothrop of Gravity's Rainbow may be an example of this last kind of
character. Although Slothrop, like Callisto, may have been led (or let himself be
led) to self·destruction by t he ominously aligned categories surrounding him,
Pynchon also leaves open the possibility that Slothrop has managed, with some
free will, to escape being fixed In or by any one category.
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